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Context
Attaining consensus with no constraints on the consensus participation is a fundamental feature of decentralized
blockchain solutions such as Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008) and Ethereum (Buterin et al., 2013). Unrestricted consensus
participation removes the possibility of censorship and a potential single point of failure, but this design has led to
a new concern: that of centralization. Centralization in decentralized blockchain refers to the concentration of a
large portion of computing resources to a select few participants. In this paper, we identify the restriction on new
participation as a critical contributor to the centralization of consensus power towards commercial and large-scale
entities. We also examine the cause of the indirect restriction on participation and propose a metric to identify the
degree of these indirect restrictions. This new metric may be used as a threat indicator to identify the centralization
of decentralized blockchain caused by indirect participation restrictions.
Objective
Depending on the constraints over consensus participation and ledger data replication, we can classify blockchain into
three categories: public, private and consortium blockchain. In private and consortium blockchain the participation
and replication of data is constrained to a single organization or a group of organizations whereas in public
blockchain there are no bounds on consensus participation and replication. Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008) and Ethereum
(Buterin et al., 2013) are most prominent examples of a public blockchain. The public blockchains are often
referred to as decentralized blockchain because of the constraint-free nature of consensus participation and data
replication. Decentralized blockchains allow any user to join the peer-to-peer distributed system to participate in
the consensus mechanism and replicate the data. The participating users are incentivized for honest behavior. A
subset of decentralized blockchains implements a Proof-of-Work protocol (Dwork and Naor, 1992) to incentivize
participating entities. In proof of work, every participant is tasked with a computationally intensive cryptographic
puzzle. These participants are also known as miners, and the process of solving the cryptographic puzzle is known
as mining. The monetary value of the incentive drives participation. The recent rise in the value of significant
cryptocurrencies has resulted in an arms race for more control over the network to attain a higher reward. This arms
race has increased the difficulty of the cryptographic puzzles, making it more expensive to solve. This significant
increase in difficulty may result in limiting the participation pool to a select few. This limitation imposes an indirect
constraint on consensus participation making the network more centralized. The objective of this study is to propose
a metric that can be used to measure indirect participation constraint.
Approach
Cost of Mining
To profitability mine on a Proof-of-Work blockchain, the rewards earned should be greater than the expanses of
the mining operation. The reward from mining includes the Block Rewards (currently 12.5 BTC for Bitcoin and
2 ETH for Ethereum) and transaction fee (referred to as gas price in Ethereum). On the other hand, the expenses
involve the purchase of appropriate hardware for mining and the operational costs. The operational costs prove to
be significantly higher than the hardware cost over time. Cost of electricity is the prime contributing factor to the
operational costs involved in mining. We adhere to the method used by (O’Dwyer and Malone, 2014) to define the
cost of electricity (Ce) for one block is Ce =
D∗232∗P∗(U)
R . D is defined as the difficulty of mining which is defined by
the overall network participation, P is the power efficiency of the mining equipment used by the miner, U is the unit
cost of electricity for a joule of energy, and R is hashing power of the mining equipment used by the miner. The
time it takes to mine one block is defined as τ = D∗2
32
R (O’Dwyer and Malone, 2014).
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To better model the costs involved in mining, we propose a new metric that considers the cost of hardware (Hc)
and cost of electricity (Ec) for a period of time t as Cm = Hc+Ec. Where Ec is defined over a time period t as
(Ec = t ∗P∗U) unlike in the equation proposed by (O’Dwyer and Malone, 2014) where the cost of electricity is
defined over successful mining of a block. If the value of t is a positive multiple of τ than the miner earns the block
reward for the mined blocks. We define the revenue earned by a miner in time t as Revenue= ( tτ )∗Br. Where, Br is
the reward earned by the miner for mining a single block (currently 12.5 BTC for Bitcoin and 2 ETH for Ethereum).
The transaction fee has only been a tiny fraction of the total revenue of miner historically; thus it is omitted from the
equation(Bitcoin currency statistics n.d.). The rational decision of participation depends on if Revenue generated
over time t is greater than the cost of mining Cm over the same time. We define Pro f it as the difference between Cm
and Revenue for a miner with mining equipment with the hash power of R and power efficiency of P.
The probability of solving the hash puzzle before the rest of the network depends on the difficulty of mining (D)
and the hash power of the equipment (R). This probability determines the revenue earned by the mining operation.
The difficulty of mining (D) increases or decreases based on the total hashing power of the network to maintain a
predefined network proprieties such as block creation time. To allow profitable participation of new miners, the rate
of growth of D should correspond with the growth in R. The growth in D is determined by the number and hash
power of the participants in the network whereas the growth in R of equipment is not driven by any social factors.
This discrepancy in the growth of D and R limits the participation of new miners and favors large organizations in
performing profitable mining operations at a large scale. We also argue that Moore’s law limits the growth of R
which further increases the gap between the growth of D and R Moore, 1998.
Centralization threat metric
We propose using a new metric to measure the point where the D and the R ratio becomes a bottleneck for
new participants. We define the rate of change in D and R as ROC(D) = ( DcurrentDprevious − 1) ∗ 100 and ROC(R) =
( RcurrentRprevious −1)∗100. We use the rate of change of D and the rate of change of R to measure the growth difference.
We define a new metric known as Difficulty To Equipment Hash Power ratio (DER). The value of DER is equal to
the ratio of change in difficulty (D) to the change in hash power of commercial equipment (R). We define DER as
DER= ROC(D)ROC(R) . DER has a direct implication on the minimum cost of mining (Cm) for a profitable mining operation.
The higher the value of DER, the higher the cost of mining. With an increase in the cost of mining, the profit falls
and lowers the incentive for participation. The reduced incentive for participation may result in a more centralized
network.
Conclusion
In this paper, we reason that the increase in centralization is a threat to the constraint-free participation property of
decentralized blockchain. We identify key contributing factors to the centralizations. Cost of mining may be the
core limiting factor in the participation of new miners in the network which may contribute to the centralization.
We propose a modified equation for calculating the cost of mining over a period of t. By considering the period,
we can better predict the rationale of an individual or organization. We also propose a novel metric to determine
the alarming level of participation constraints that may lead to centralization for an instance of the decentralized
blockchain. The modeling presented in this paper allows us to examine the participation restrictions based on the
cost of mining and how it leads to a more centralized network. In the future, we intend on expanding our model to
examine the impact of existing mining pools on the decentralization of the network. We also intend on differentiating
between a decentralized mining pool and a commercialized mining pool. We wish to use our model on the historical
data from Ethereum and Bitcoin network to observe the relationship between the rise of pooled mining and Cm.
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